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I. INTRODUcTION
in August 2009 Brian and natalia Burns were found guilty (separate jury trials) of the 
manslaughter of David Hay. the prosecution’s case against both defendants was based on two 
allegations. First, they caused the death of the deceased by an unlawful and dangerous act, that 
being the administration of methadone by injection to the deceased. Alternatively, they were 
liable for manslaughter by gross criminal negligence.1 the nsW court of criminal Appeal 
(nsWccA) on 1 April 2011 dismissed natalie Burn’s appeal against her conviction.2 
At the beginning of February 2010, charges of murder and manslaughter were laid against 
Dr suresh nair.3 in December 2010, Dr nair pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of a suellen 
Zaupa who died following the consumption of cocaine which Dr nair had supplied during sex 
sessions at his residence. in return for this plea, the prosecution dropped its charge of murder 
in relation to Ms Zaupa as well as a further manslaughter charge involving the death of another 
victim, victoria Mcintyre.4 On 26 August 2011, Dr nair received a non-parole period of five 
years and three months for the manslaughter and cocaine supply convictions:
the court had heard that nair had done nothing to help Ms Zaupa as she lay dying from a cocaine 
overdose, which he had given her. He failed to call an ambulance or take her to hospital.5
then, on 18 February 2010, a 22 year-old woman was charged with the manslaughter of ex-
socceroo, ian Gray. the basis of the charge was that the accused supplied Gray with heroin and 
that he died in the presence of the accused as a result of a heroin overdose:
Papers at central local court allege sherryn Davis caused the death of ian Gray ‘in 
circumstances amounting to manslaughter, to wit, an unlawful and dangerous act’.6
On 15 september 2010, however, the manslaughter charge was withdrawn:
At sydney’s central local court last week, prosecutors withdrew a charge of manslaughter and 
a second charge of administering or attempting to administer a prohibited drug to Gray.7
the reporting of the above cases also occurred around the same time as the Dianne Brimble case 
which received enormous coverage in the media. in 2002 Ms Brimble died from an overdose 
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1 R v Natalia Burns [2009] nsWDc 232.
2 Natalia Burns v R [2011] nsWccA 56.
3 natasha Wallace, ‘nair to Face court on Murder count’, Sydney Morning Herald (online) 5 
February 2010 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/nair-to-face-court-on-murder-count-20100204-
ngam.html>.
4 AAP, ‘nair to Plead Guilty to Manslaughter’, Sydney Morning Herald (online) 23 December 2010 
<http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/nair-to-plead-guilty-to-manslaughter-20101223-
1963c.html>.
5 Paul Bibby, ‘sydney surgeon gets Five Years’ Jail for Prostitute’s Fatal Drug Overdose’, 26 
August 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/sydney-surgeon-gets-five-years-jail-for-prostitutes-
fatal-drug-overdose-20110826-1jde4.html>.
6 nick ralston, ‘socceroo Death: Woman Denied Bail’, 18 February 2010 <http://www.smh.com.
au/national/socceroo-death-woman-denied-bail-20100217-odzb.html>.
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of GHB, the drugs being supplied by Mark Wilhelm during a P&O cruise (the Brimble case). 
the unsavoury facts of this case are well-known, Wilhelm having had sex with Ms Brimble 
prior to her overdosing, her naked body being found on the floor of Wilhelm’s cabin. it was not 
until 2009, however, that the trial of Wilhelm commenced, the prosecution proceeding with a 
preferred charge of negligent manslaughter (unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter in the 
alternative). On 12 October the prosecution dropped the negligent manslaughter charge due to 
its inability to prove both a duty of care and causation, thereafter proceeding on the alternative 
manslaughter charge and the drug supply charge. One week later, Wilhelm’s trial was aborted 
due to the jury being unable to reach a verdict in one of the two charges laid. A retrial on both 
charges was set down for April 2010. On 21 April, however, the prosecution dropped the charge 
of manslaughter and accepted a plea of guilty to the supply of a small quantity of GHB. in 
commenting on these developments, Howie J, the original trial judge, stated that Wilhelm was 
responsible for Ms Brimble’s death only in a moral or technical way and that he doubted that he 
was criminally responsible.8
All of these cases raise significant legal issues regarding the liability of a drug supplier for 
the death of a person who dies as a result of the self-administration of those drugs. in nsW, 
however, there would appear to be only one other self-administration drug case prior to those 
identified above, this being the unreported 1999 District court case, Quoc Cao9. in addition, 
there is also relevant obiter from McLean10 in 1981. As for other Australian jurisdictions, the 
only other relevant reported case is the Queensland case of Stott & Van Embden11. 
For many this lack of case law may seem surprising given the number of drug overdose 
deaths each year in Australia. in nsW in 2006, for example, there were 132 opiate-related 
deaths in those aged 15–44 years, 54 deaths associated with benzodiazepines and 28 deaths 
associated with psychostimulants. Psychostimulants include cocaine and amphetamines (eg 
GHB).12 Given this number of deaths, it would not be unreasonable to presume that some of 
the individuals who supplied the drugs to any of these victims, or who assisted the victims with 
the consumption of these drugs in some other way, did so in circumstances that could have, 
potentially, given rise to manslaughter charges. in addition, it would not be unreasonable to 
presume that such individuals were known to the police. 
charges and convictions for manslaughter have been more common where defendants have 
actually administered (mostly by injection) drugs to the victims, but even these are rare. this 
article however, only briefly considers this type of manslaughter, its focus being on drug supply 
and self-administration. 
not only is there a scarcity of cases, a search of Australian law journals discloses only two 
legal analyses of this area, these being two law student works.13 this is in stark contrast to the 
united Kingdom (uK) where the law has received much greater consideration. the recent cases 
(notably all from nsW) now provide an excellent opportunity to undertake a comprehensive 
analysis of the charge of manslaughter as a viable mechanism for the prosecution of a drug 
supplier for the death of a person who dies as a result of the self-administration of those drugs. 
8 Geesche Jacobsen, ‘Brimble Death: Manslaughter charge Dropped’, 21 April 2010 <http://www.
smh.com.au/national/brimble-death-manslaughter-charge-dropped-20100421-ssl4.html>. see also 
r v Wilhelm [2010] nsWsc 378.
9 R v Quoc Cao (1999) (unreported, new south Wales District court, Ford ADcJ, (October 1999) 
(‘Cao’). A summary of the facts of the case can be found in J schimmel, ‘Heroin, Homicide and 
Public Health’ (2002) 14 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 135. 
10 McLean v R (1981) 5 A crim r 36 (‘McLean’).
11 R v Stott & Van Embden [2001] QcA 313 (‘Stott & Van Embden’).
12 report of the chief Health Officer, The Health of the People of New South Wales (2008) nsW 
Department of Health <http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/publichealth/chorep/>.
13 schimmel, above n 9 and Paul Duke, ‘Drug Dealers and Fatal self-Administration in Australia: A 
cause for concern’ (2008) 1(1) Queensland Law Student Review 12.
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II. MANSLAUGHTER
in Australia, only a very small number of drug suppliers have been charged with and convicted 
of the manslaughter of those who have consumed the drugs that they have supplied. At common 
law, this has been in the form of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter or negligent 
manslaughter. in terms of Australian code jurisdictions there are similarities in terms of negligent 
manslaughter but differences when it comes to unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. this 
is considered later, but in code states, such as Queensland, charges have raised similar issues, 
most notably causation.
in nsW two drug related offences have formed the basis for unlawful and dangerous act 
manslaughter charges; aiding and abetting self-administration by the victim and administering 
prohibited drugs to a victim (usually by injection). the Brimble case appears to suggest an 
expanded approach but the outcome in the case casts considerable doubt on this.14 in this regard, 
Howie, J’s decision to allow Wilhelm to withdraw a guilty plea to s39 Crimes Act 1900 (nsW) 
is significant.15 Following what was a somewhat strange plea bargain which saw Wilhelm offer 
a plea of guilty to a charge under s39 in return for the dropping of the manslaughter charge, 
Howie J not only allowed the defence to withdraw the plea but stated that he would not have 
allowed it in any event.16 the basis of the charge would have been that Wilhelm ‘caused’ Diane 
Brimble to take the drugs. As Howie J noted:
i pointed out to the crown that there were a number of cases which tended to suggest, at least 
to me, that what was required for the crown to prove was that the accused stood in a position of 
authority or control over Ms Brimble so that he could, in effect, overbore her will and therefore 
cause her to take the drug. i had a good idea of what the evidence was, having been the trial 
judge, and i had difficulty in seeing, on the evidence that was at the trial of the accused, how 
it could be said that he had any authority or position of control over Ms Brimble whereby he 
could, in effect, cause her to take the drug.17
A. Aiding and Abetting Self-Administration
Cao appears to be not only the sole nsW case involving such a charge, but the only case 
Australia wide.18 the legal basis for cao’s charge was that his supplying of the victim with a 
syringe made him a secondary party to the victim’s self-administration of heroin, and, thereafter, 
a principle to the manslaughter of the victim.19 self-administration is a summary offence under 
s12, Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (nsW) and s19 makes a person who aids, abets, 
14 R v Wilhelm [2010] nsWsc 334 (‘Wilhelm’).
15 Wilhelm [2010] nsWsc 334, [29]. crimes Act 1900 (nsW) s 39(1) A person is guilty of an 
offence if: 
(a) the person administers to another person, or causes another person to take, any poison, intoxicating 
substance or other destructive or noxious thing, and 
(b) the poison, intoxicating substance or other thing endangers the life of, or inflicts grievous bodily 
harm on, the other person, and 
(c) the person intends to injure, or is reckless about injuring, the other person. 
16 Wilhelm [2010] nsWsc 334, [28].
17 Wilhelm [2010] nsWsc 334, [12].
18 in addition to nsW, victoria (Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (vic) s75), 
south Australia (Controlled Substances Act 1984 (sA) s33l), Western Australia (Poisons Act 
1964 (WA) s36) and tasmania (Misuse of Drugs Act 2001 (tas) s24) all have drug use/self-
administration offences.
19 schimmel, above n 9, 136.Cao (1999) (unreported, new south Wales District court, Ford ADcJ, 
(October 1999).
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counsels, procures, solicits or incites the commission of such an offence also liable for that 
offence.20
in his analysis of Cao, schimmel notes the relevance of obiter in McLean. 
roden J (with whom nagle cJ at cl and Fisher JK agreed) suggested that where death occurs 
as a result of the administration of heroin, a person may be guilty in three circumstances: first, 
if the accused… injected the deceased; second, if the accused is ‘present intentionally assisting 
or encouraging that act (principal in the second degree)’; or third, ‘if not present he [sic] had 
counselled or assisted the act (accessory before the fact).21
leaving aside any legal arguments as to whether cao aided, abetted counselled, procured, 
solicited or incited the victim’s self-administration of heroin, sections 12(1) and 19 of the Drug 
Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (nsW) render unlawful the acts of anyone who does. But 
would such acts be unlawful and dangerous so as to cause the victim’s death resulting from 
self-administration? in Cao, schimmel notes Ford ADcJ’s (the trial judge) early doubts as to 
whether the accused’s acts were initially dangerous:
[i]t is rather doubtful that it could be relied upon as a dangerous act on the part of the accused, 
merely in supplying a needle which the deceased then chose to use himself for the purpose of 
injecting himself with heroin.22
in directing the jury, however, Ford ADcJ had seemingly shifted from the dangerousness of 
cao’s act of supplying the syringe to the perceived dangerousness of the victim injecting himself 
with heroin. schimmel rightly questions whether self-administration of heroin is dangerous 
and accordingly ‘carrying with it an appreciable risk of serious injury.’23 statistically, the vast 
majority of heroin self-administration does not lead to serious injury, but this is all relevant 
to the act of the deceased.24 the legal question in Cao should have been was his supplying of 
the syringe unlawful and ‘carrying with it an appreciable risk of serious injury’ and, as such, 
a cause of the victim’s death? it is argued here that the answer must be no. Apart from Ford 
ADcJ’s earlier doubts on this very point, the english case of Dalby supports this position. in 
Dalby, the accused was charged with unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter based purely on 
his supplying the victim with a controlled drug, the victim thereafter injecting himself with the 
drugs. Waller J read the judgment of the court stating that:
[t]he difficulty in the present case is that the act of supplying a controlled drug was not an act 
which caused direct harm. it was an act which made it possible, or even likely, that harm would 
occur subsequently, particularly if the drug was supplied to somebody who was on drugs. in 
all the reported cases, the physical act has been one which inevitably would subject the other 
person to the risk of some harm from the act itself. in this case, the supply of drugs would 
itself have caused no harm unless the deceased had subsequently used the drugs in a form and 
quantity which was dangerous.25
As such, the act of supplying the drugs, or supplying a syringe as in Cao, seems neither dangerous 
nor a legal cause of death. What causes the harm, and is accordingly dangerous, is the victim’s 
use of those drugs in a particular form and quantity. 
20 Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) s12(1): ‘A person who administers or attempts to 
administer a prohibited drug to himself or herself is guilty of an offence.’ Drug Misuse and 
Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) s19: ‘A person who aids, abets, counsels, procures, solicits or incites 
the commission of an offence under this Division is guilty of an offence and liable to the same 
punishment, pecuniary penalties and forfeiture as the person would be if the person had committed 
the firstmentioned offence.’
21 McLean (1981) 5 A crim r 36, 41 as cited in schimmel, above n 9, 136.
22 As quoted in schimmel, above n 9, 137.
23 schimmel, above n 9, 141.
24 schimmel, above n 9, 142.
25 R v Dalby [1982] 1 All er 916, 919 (‘Dalby’).
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this legal position is further supported by the victorian supreme court’s decision in 
Demirian.26 in this case Demirian conspired with the victim to build a bomb. the bomb, 
however, exploded prematurely when the victim was setting the triggering device, killing the 
victim instantly. As a result, Demirian was charged and convicted of conspiracy to cause an 
explosion and murder. in allowing his appeal against the murder conviction and recording an 
acquittal, the court also stated that there was no basis for liability for manslaughter;
Demirian could not be guilty of manslaughter as an accessory unless levonian as principal 
offender committed a crime by killing himself. levonian did not commit a crime by 
unintentionally killing himself as there has never been a crime of self-manslaughter.27
this does not mean that aiding and abetting a drug offence can never form the basis for a 
charge of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. in Lamb, the nsWccA considered an 
appeal against a sentence for manslaughter arising from a situation where the appellant and 
her co-defendant were charged with unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter following the 
injection of the victim with morphine by the co-defendant.28 the co-defendant was charged 
and convicted (having plead guilty) as a principal in the first degree. lamb was convicted as 
a principal in the second degree in that she assisted in the administration of the drugs to the 
victim.29 
B. Administering Drugs
Lamb confirms the basis for unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter where the accused 
injects (or otherwise administers) the victim with dangerous drugs. As such Lamb follows the 
position taken in the uK in Cato.30 in Cato, the accused and the victim injected each other with 
prohibited drugs over a number of hours. Both suffered serious complications as a result, but 
while the accused was apparently saved by some basic first aid administered by a house mate, 
the victim did not likewise respond and died from respiratory failure. cato was charged and 
convicted of manslaughter arising from an unlawful and dangerous act, namely s23, Offences 
Against the Person Act, 1861 (24 & 25 vict c 100).31 in dismissing his appeal, the court of 
Appeal determined that cato was clearly guilty under s23, that this was unlawful and dangerous 
and that it had caused the victims death. the court firmly rejected the appellant’s submission 
that the administration could not be viewed as malicious due to the circumstances and as such 
s23 could not be proven: 
[e] ver since cato it has been clear that if it is the supplier who administers the fatal drug to the 
victim (usually by injection), a manslaughter conviction inexorably follows.32 
this is the settled position in nsW, but in the Australian capital territory (Act) case of Lagan, 
Higgins J, in a trial by judge alone, appeared to depart from Cato in holding that:
… it is apparent that, in the present case the intent shown by the evidence, was not to injure or to 
cause any pain or annoyance to Ms earl. in fact, the only conclusion that can sensibly be drawn 
26 R v Demirian [1989] vr 97.
27 ibid at 126.
28 R v Tanya Lamb (1997) (unreported, new south Wales court of criminal Appeal, (Glesson cJ, 
Mason P and Dowd J), (3 April 1997) (‘Lamb’).
29 ibid.
30 R v Cato [1976] 1 Wlr 110.
31 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 vict c 100) s23 states: 
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously administer to or cause to be administered to or taken 
by any other person any poison or other destructive or noxious thing, so as thereby to endanger the 
life of such person, or so as thereby to inflict upon such person any grievous bodily harm, shall be 
guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable... to be kept in penal servitude for any 
term not exceeding ten years.
32 r Heaton, ‘Dealers in Death’ (2003) Criminal Law Review 497.
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from the evidence was that the administration of the heroin was intended to relieve Ms earl’s 
feelings of depression, to dull her awareness of emotional pain. that is, to ‘help’ not harm her.33
1. Queensland
the Queensland case, Stott & Van Embden, appears to be the only case outside of nsW which 
deals with the liability of a drug supplier for the death of a person who subsequently self-
administers those drugs.34 in Stott & Van Embden the defendants were originally tried for 
murder and in the alternative manslaughter. As to manslaughter, the prosecution alleged that 
the defendants had caused the victim’s death by either i) injecting him directly or ii) handing 
him a syringe of heroin which he then self-administered. the jury found the defendants guilty 
of manslaughter. the basis for the defendants’ liability under the first approach was negligent 
manslaughter. As to the second alternative, it was noted that s291 of the Criminal Code Act 
1891 (Qld) states: ‘it is unlawful to kill any person unless such killing is authorised or justified 
or excused by law.’ 
the prosecution’s case was that the accused’s unlawfully killed the victim when one of them 
prepared and handed to the victim a syringe of heroin which the victim then self- administered. 
As this was not ‘authorised or justified or excused by law’ then liability was established. Duke 
questions this conclusion and raises doubts as to the court’s approach to causation.35 On the 
basis of the second alternative, the facts were that a 27 year-old male, with a history of drug use, 
was given a syringe containing heroin by one of the defendants. in the absence of any evidence 
suggesting force, deception or mistaken belief, this informed adult victim then freely and 
voluntarily injected himself with the drugs. looking at the individual judgements, McPherson 
JA concluded that there was nothing wrong with the trial judges direction that if the second 
factual basis for manslaughter was to be taken then the defendants would not be responsible 
for the death of the victim only if it was an accident, that is that the person supplying the drugs 
would not have reasonably foreseen the victim’s death as a possible outcome.36
Atkinson J concurs but briefly, at least, considers the issue of causation: 
[32] At common law, mere supply would not itself be sufficient to constitute the 
actus reus of the offence of manslaughter because it is not an act which itself causes 
direct harm. section 293 of the Criminal Code, however, provides the following 
definition of ‘killing’:
 ‘... any person who causes the death of another, directly or indirectly, by any means whatever, 
is deemed to have killed that other person.’
so, under the Code, a person is taken to have killed another if he or she causes the other’s death, 
whether directly or indirectly.37
While acknowledging the difference between causation in code jurisdictions to that taken by 
the common law, Duke contends that the difference is not that great so as to justify such a 
significant departure. He notes that:
if what Atkinson J says is correct and a causal nexus can be established, the word ‘indirect’ 
would not only be seen as being responsible for incarcerating a number of drug dealers who 
find themselves entangled in cases of fatal self‐administration, but for also bypassing the very 
foundation upon which the criminal law is based — individual autonomy and free will. such a 
situation seems implausible.38
33 R v John Lagan [2001] Actsc 131, [88] (‘Lagan’).
34 Stott & Van Embden [2001] QcA 313.
35 Duke, above n 13. 
36 Stott & Van Embden [2001] QcA 313, [22].
37 ibid [32].
38 Duke, above n 13, 21.
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indeed, if this is good law, even just in Queensland (and other code jurisdictions with 
similar provisions39), then it is arguable that there should be many more prosecutions in self-
administration cases, regardless of the difficulties in identifying the person(s) who supplied the 
drugs. 
c. Self-Administration and Causation
Stott & Van Embden must also now be considered in light of the House of lords decision in 
Kennedy No.2, even though this case is only strictly relevant to the common law.40 in Kennedy 
No.2, the accused prepared a syringe of heroin and handed it to the victim who immediately 
injected himself. After a prolonged process of appeal, the certified question before the House 
of lords was:
[w]hen is it appropriate to find someone guilty of manslaughter where that person has been 
involved in the supply of a class A controlled drug, which is then freely and voluntarily self-
administered by the person to whom it was supplied, and the administration of the drug then 
causes his death?41
the court noted at the outset that:
the criminal law generally assumes the existence of free will. the law recognises certain 
exceptions, in the case of the young, those who for any reason are not fully responsible for their 
actions, and the vulnerable, and it acknowledges situations of duress and necessity, and also 
of deception and mistake. But, generally speaking, informed adults of sound mind are treated 
as autonomous beings able to make their own decisions how they will act, and none of the 
exceptions is relied on as possibly applicable in this case. thus D is not to be treated as causing 
v to act in a certain way if v makes a voluntary and informed decision to act in that way rather 
than another.42
in his analysis, Duke refers to the contrasting positions taken by Heaton and Williams 
concerning causation in self-administration manslaughter cases.43 While Heaton considers that 
the best approach is to see the victim as comparable to a third party who intervenes and thus 
breaks the chain of causation, Williams sees merit in an adapted approach based on the natural 
consequences test. Duke notes that the House of lords in Kennedy No.2, shows some preference 
for the third party approach but fails to clearly resolve the issue by undertaking any thorough 
examination ‘of how cases of fatal self-administration fit into the wider law of causation.’44 
Duke is right about the need to more thoroughly resolve the issue of causation particularly 
when the court’s position on self-administration is hardly the essence of clarity, but the House 
of lords response to the certified question before it was very concise.
the answer to the certified question is: ‘in the case of a fully-informed and responsible adult, 
never.’45
Further to this, the House of lords confirmed that Dalby is clear authority that:
…where the charge of manslaughter is based on an unlawful and dangerous act, it must be an act 
directed at the victim and likely to cause immediate injury, however slight.46
39 see, eg, s270 Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA).
40 R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] 4 All er 1083 (‘Kennedy (no. 2)’).
41 ibid [2].
42 ibid [14].
43 russell Heaton, ‘Principles? no Principles’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 463 and r Williams, 
‘Policy and Principle in Drugs Manslaughter cases’ (2005) Cambridge Law Journal 463, as 
discussed in Duke, above n13,15–18.
44 ibid 18.
45 Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] 4 All er 1083, [25].
46 Dalby [1982] 1 All er 916, 919.
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in the case of ‘a fully-informed and responsible adult’, therefore, the supplying of the drugs is 
not an operating and substantial cause of the victim’s death. Further, and in accordance with 
Royall, nor can it be said that death was a natural consequence of the accused’s conduct, or that 
it was reasonably forseeable.47 What remains unanswered is the legal position if a victim was 
not fully-informed, was not an adult, or there were other factors affecting the free-will of the 
victim. in such circumstances, it would appear arguable that self-administration by the victim 
may not necessarily break the chain of causation and if it can then be established that what the 
accused did was operating and substantial, a natural consequence or reasonably forseeable, then 
causation could be established. 
this is not to say that liability will never arise in drug supply and self-administration 
cases, but it is arguable that the better approach is negligent manslaughter, assuming that the 
circumstances give rise to such a charge. 
D. Negligent Manslaughter
the first approach to the defendants’ liability for manslaughter in Stott & Van Embden was 
based on the submission that one of the defendants had injected the victim with what was 
described as a large/strong dose of heroin.48 in this regard, the jury was directed to consider 
negligent manslaughter under s 289 Criminal Code Act 1891 (Qld).49
While this is clearly different to the common law where this would be dealt with by way of 
an unlawful and dangerous act, the case is significant as the only other reported Australian case 
of negligent manslaughter involving those who have supplied drugs.50 in Stott & Van Embden, 
no complaint was made with regard to the direction on the first approach to manslaughter. the 
defendants had in their charge a dangerous thing, that being a syringe containing a large, strong 
dose of heroin. in injecting the victim they had failed in their duty of care to avoid danger and 
had ‘caused any consequences which result to the life or health of any person by reason of any 
omission to perform that duty.’ As to the degree of fault required, ‘his Honour summed up on 
criminal negligence in accordance with the decision in Callaghan v The Queen.’51
this latter direction is significant, Callaghan stating that, for the purposes of Australian 
code jurisdictions, courts should follow the common law as to gross/criminal negligence.52 At 
common law, Nydam states that gross/criminal negligence is proven where an accused breaches 
his/her duty of care ‘in circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the standard 
of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk 
that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal 
punishment.’53 the difference between s 289 Criminal Code Act 1891 (Qld), above, and the 
common law (as applied in nsW) is that the latter requires the initial identification and proof of 
a legally recognised duty of care.
very recently, in Burns, the nsWccA considered an appeal against a conviction for 
manslaughter resulting from the death of a victim who had consumed methadone supplied by the 
47 Royall v R (1991) 172 clr 278 (‘Royall’).
48 Stott & Van Embden [2001] QcA 313.
49 Duty of persons in charge of dangerous things: 
it is the duty of every person who has in the person’s charge or under the person’s control anything, 
whether living or inanimate, and whether moving or stationary, of such a nature that, in the absence 
of care or precaution in its use or management, the life, safety, or health, of any person may be 
endangered, to use reasonable care and take reasonable precautions to avoid such danger, and the 
person is held to have caused any consequences which result to the life or health of any person by 
reason of any omission to perform that duty.
50 the other case being R v Natalia Burns [2009] nsWDc 232 and Natalia Burns v R [2011] 
nsWccA 56.
51 Stott & Van Embden [2001] QcA 313, [17].
52 Callaghan v R (1952) 85 clr 115 (‘Callaghan’).
53 Nydam v R [1977] vr 430, 445 (‘nydam’).
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appellant and her partner.54 the case is somewhat complicated by the fact that the prosecution’s 
case was based on both unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter and negligent manslaughter, 
the basis for the unlawful and dangerous act charge being that there was evidence that the 
appellant and her partner had actually administered the drugs to the deceased. the charge of 
negligent manslaughter was based on the allegation that the appellant and her partner both 
owed the victim a duty of care which they breached by failing to provide reasonable assistance 
to the victim when he became ill as a result of consuming the methadone they had supplied. in 
addition, their failure to assist caused the victim’s death.
On appeal it was argued that:
Ground 1: His Honour erred in refusing to remove the charge of manslaughter by gross criminal 
negligence from the consideration of the jury. 
Ground 2: His Honour erred in directing the jury that there was a duty of care owed by a supplier 
of drugs towards the drug recipient.55
in dismissing the appeal, the court held that a duty arose in the circumstances of a voluntary 
assumption of care in circumstances of a helpless person.56 Further to this, the court also 
recognised that a duty arose from the fact that by supplying the drug the appellant created a 
danger to the deceased and that any person who deliberately puts another in danger has a legal 
duty to take steps to remove that danger.57 in this regard, the court cited with approval the recent 
english case of Evans58 ultimately concluding that the trial judge’s directions were in line with 
that case and therefore correctly reflected the law.59 
in her analysis of Evans, Williams similarly identifies the above two approaches to the duty 
of care question. in Evans, carly townsend died of a heroin overdose at her mother’s home. ‘Her 
mother, Andrea townsend and her half-sister, Gemma evans, were charged with manslaughter 
by gross negligence in that they failed to render aid when it was clear that carly had overdosed 
on heroin.’60 While Andrea townsend’s duty arose from her maternal relationship to carly, 
evans’s duty arose due to her being carly’s half-sister and that it was she who had obtained the 
drugs from a supplier and then handed them on to carly. 
the appeal by evans against her conviction was dismissed but Williams highlights a number 
of problems with the court of Appeal’s judgment, including causation.61 Williams rightly notes 
that the House of lords in Kennedy stated that:
this appeal is concerned only with unlawful act manslaughter and nothing in this opinion should 
be understood as applying to manslaughter caused by gross negligence.62
But this does not avoid the extent to which the voluntary acts of the ‘fully-informed and 
responsible adult’ user break the chain of causation initially created by the existence of a duty 
of care. this may not have been an issue in Evans due to the age (16 years) of the victim, but 
Williams contends that this is not so much of a problem in cases of negligent manslaughter 
54 Natalia Burns v R [2011] nsWccA 56 (‘Burns’).
55 ibid [89].
56 ibid [97] and [98]. 
57 ibid [105].
58 R v Evans (Gemma) [2009] eWcA crim 650 (‘Evans’) as discussed in G Williams, ‘Gross 
negligence Manslaughter and Duty of care in “Drugs” cases: r v evans’ (2009) 6 Criminal Law 
Review 631.
59 Burns [2011] nsWccA 56, [119].
60 Williams, ‘Gross negligence Manslaughter and Duty of care in “Drugs” cases: r v evans’, above 
n 51, 633.
61 ibid 637–41.
62 R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] 4 All er 1083, [6].
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in any event. Omerod and Fortson suggest that in such situations, ‘[s]ince v’s acts would be 
completed, the causation question could be circumvented’.63
Ormerod had also commented that:
the argument that the victim’s act breaks the chain of causation may be less compelling in the 
context of gross negligence. in unlawful act manslaughter cases based on s.23, v’s voluntary 
self-administration precludes the prosecution establishing this element of the s.23 offence. in 
gross negligence, it might be argued that the whole of D’s course of conduct is in issue and that 
as such there is no break in the chain of causation.64
the whole of an accused’s course of conduct in circumstances, such as those in Evans, comprises 
the creation of danger through the supply of the drugs leading to a duty to remedy this danger 
by immediately seeking medical assistance following the victim’s overdose. in this regard, a 
failure to seek such timely medical assistance is a cause of the victim’s death and the victim’s 
self-administration, while contributing to the death, does not break this chain of causation.
this does not mean that causation will never be an issue in negligent manslaughter cases 
involving the supply of drugs. in the recent nsW case of Justins, the accused supplied her 
partner with nembutal, the victim subsequently consuming the drug and dying as a result.65 
At trial, Justins was found not guilty of murder but guilty of negligent manslaughter. the basis 
for her conviction was that the deceased had severe Alzheimer’s disease and as a result lacked 
the capacity to make an informed decision about committing suicide.66 As such, Justins owed 
the deceased a duty of care to determine that the deceased had a capacity to understand. On 
appeal, the nsWccA held that there had not only been a misdirection as to the meaning of 
an ‘informed decision’, but that it was unlikely that a failure to enquire could constitute the 
conduct that caused the death.67
III. cONcLUSION
it would appear to be settled law in Australia that an accused commits manslaughter where he/
she administers drugs to another and this person dies as a result of the administration of the 
drugs. in addition a person could aid and abet another in such administration and accordingly 
be liable for manslaughter as a secondary party.68 in Cao, however, it was held that someone 
can aid and abet a victim’s self-administration and that this can then be seen as an unlawful 
and dangerous act for the purposes of manslaughter. 69 this paper has argued that this is legally 
wrong. it is not only questionable whether aiding and abetting self-administration amounts to 
an unlawful and dangerous act, but such aiding and abetting self-administration through the 
supplying of drugs (or the means to use those drugs) does not cause the death of a victim who 
has ‘freely and voluntarily self-administered’ the drugs.70
Again citing Dalby:
63 D Ormerod and r Fortson, ‘Drug suppliers as Manslaughterers (Again)’ [2005] Criminal Law 
Review 819, as quoted in Willaims, above n 51, 639. 
64 c Barsby and D Ormerod, ‘case comment. Homicide: Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s 
23’ [2003] Criminal Law Review 555, as quoted in Williams, ‘Gross negligence Manslaughter and 
Duty of care in “Drugs” cases: r v evans’, above n 51, 639.
65 Justins v R [2010] nsWccA 242 (‘Justins’).
66 ibid [1].
67 ibid [110].
68 Lamb (1997) (unreported, new south Wales court of Appeal, 3 April 1997).
69 Cao (1999) (unreported, new south Wales District court, Ford ADcJ, October 1999).
70 Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] 4 All er 1083. Due to the fact that there is there is no offence of self-
administration in the uK, it might be arguable that the courts could have come to a different 
conclusion had there been such an offence. in light of the emphatic ruling by the House of lords in 
Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] 4 All er 1083, however, this appears now to be irrelevant.
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…where the charge of manslaughter is based on an unlawful and dangerous act, it must be an act 
directed at the victim and likely to cause immediate injury, however slight.71
As such, in Australia (at common law at least) and the uK, there is apparent consensus that 
the mere supply of dangerous drugs can never ground a charge of manslaughter. Given the 
similarity in facts between Kennedy72 and Stott & Van Embden73 there must also now be some 
doubt as to the second grounds for manslaughter in this Queensland case. 
the problem of causation arising from a charge of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous 
act, however, ‘may be less compelling’74 where the charge is negligent manslaughter. Stott & 
Van Embden is an important case but it is a code case where liability for negligent manslaughter 
was based on the defendants administering drugs to the victim, not self-administration. the 
recent english case of Evans75 and nsW case of Burns76 now provide the basis for the approach 
to negligent manslaughter that would be taken at common law in Australia. this is not to say 
that liability is easily established. First, it must be established that an accused had a duty by way 
a voluntary assumption of care in circumstances of a helpless person. Alternatively, or as well, 
that a duty arose from the fact that by supplying the drug the appellant created a danger to the 
deceased and that any person who deliberately puts another in danger has a legal duty to take 
steps to remove that danger. such a duty is not necessarily easily established. Wilhelm is proof 
of this.77 
it must then be proven that a breach of such a duty caused the victims death: 
in circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the standard of care which a 
reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or grievous 
bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment.78
the leading nsW case of Taktak would suggest that this may also be difficult to prove.79
in Australia, establishing the liability for manslaughter of a drug supplier where the victim 
self-administers the drugs is accordingly problematic to say the least. the rarity of charges, let 
alone convictions, is testament to this. What the cases to date tell us is that liability will only 
arise in specific circumstances such as those arising in Burns.80 this includes that the accused 
is present at the time of the self-administration and the subsequent, resultant life-threatening 
condition of the victim, this in turn reinforcing the existence of a legal duty of care. in the 
case of Dr suresh nair, for example, one of the prostitutes who was present at the time of 
the death of the victim stated that she and the victim ‘used a rolled-up $50 to snort numerous 
lines of cocaine, supplied by nair, which she described as “strong .... it was close to pure”’.81 
she later noticed her colleague shaking uncontrollably but when she told nair something was 
wrong he said she just needed to sleep and gave her a sedative. ‘“i’m a doctor, trust me, she 
will get better,” she said nair told her.82 But the witness said blood and saliva came out of Ms 
Domingues-Zaupa’s mouth and she turned purple.’83
Accordingly, and at common law at least, negligent manslaughter stands as the most 
appropriate means of prosecuting drug suppliers where those who self-administer the drugs 
71 Dalby [1982] 1 All er 916, 919.
72 Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] 4 All er 1083.
73 Stott & Van Embden [2001] QcA 313.
74 Barsby and Omerod, above n 57.
75 Evans (Gemma) [2009] eWcA crim 650.
76 Burn [2011] nsWccA 56.
77 Wilhelm [2010] nsWsc 334. see also Williams, ‘Gross negligence Manslaughter and Duty of 
care in “Drugs” cases: r v evans’, above n 51, 637–8.
78 Nydam v R [1977] vr 430, 445.
79 R v Taktak (1988) 14 nsWlr 226 (‘Taktak’).
80 Burns [2011] nsWccA 56.
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supplied die as a result. Wilhelm, however, demonstrates the limitations of such charges.84 
Assuming that the Australian criminal justice system has an interest in prosecuting drug 
suppliers for offences in such circumstances (in addition to the obvious offences of drug 
supply), then questions arise as to whether any alternative approaches currently exist under 
Australian law or whether consideration should be given to enacting new offences. A thorough 
analysis of this would extend the scope of this paper too far but certain possibilities are worth 
mentioning. Both victoria (s22 crimes Act 1958 (vic) 85) and south Australia (s29(1) criminal 
law consolidation Act 1935 (sA)86), for example, have what could be called ‘endangerment’ 
offences. these offences appear, at least, to avoid problems with causation, but, having said 
this, both require proof of subjective states of mind. in addition, a major question is whether 
supplying drugs is conduct ‘that places or may place another person in danger of death’87 or ‘is 
likely to endanger the life of another’88?89 On the face of it, at least, such offences appear to be 
a possible means of prosecution.
84 Wilhelm [2010] nsWsc 334.
85 Crimes Act 1958 (vic) s22:
A person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly engages in conduct that places or may place another 
person in danger of death is guilty of an indictable offence. Penalty: level 5 imprisonment (10 years 
maximum).
 see also s23.
86 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (sA) s 29(1) states: 
Where a person, without lawful excuse, does an act or makes an omission— 
(a) knowing that the act or omission is likely to endanger the life of another; and 
(b) intending to endanger the life of another or being recklessly indifferent as to whether the life of 
another is endangered, that person is guilty of an offence. 
Maximum penalty: 
(a) for a basic offence—imprisonment for 15 years; 
(b) for an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 18 years.
 see also ss29(2) and (3).
87 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s22.
88 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 29(1).
89 there are no specific cases relevant to these provisions, but as to the notion of endangerment, see 
Gedeon v Commissioner of the New South Wales Crime Commission [2008] HcA 43.
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